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ADA AND ADR: APPROACHING AN ADEQUATE
ADJUDICATORY ALLOCATION
Jeffrey P. Ferrier
The Americans With Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA or the Act) has
been hailed as the most comprehensive federal civil rights statute ever
enacted.2 Its stated purpose is to eradicate the discrimination disabled
individuals face, giving them legally enforceable rights.3 Two problems
that have emerged under the ADA are the time and expense involved in
pursuing an employment discrimination claim through the federal court
system.
As litigation costs continue to escalate and the federal court docket
becomes increasingly crowded,' it can take years and thousands of dollars
to get an employment discrimination case from the complaint stage
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. James C. Harrington, Taking Liberties, TEX. LAW., July 18, 1994, at 18.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). The Congress found that unlike those who have
faced discrimination because of other physical characteristics, disabled individuals have
had "no legal recourse to redress such discrimination." Id. at § 12101(a)(4); see R. Gaull
Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54
LA. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (1994) (explaining that although "a complaint is cognizable under
the antidiscrimination laws, burgeoning case loads at the EEOC [Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission] and other agencies can cause long delays").
4. See Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment
Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements For Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA
Claims, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 985, 992 (1993) (predicting that an already taxed federal
judiciary will become swamped with litigation made possible by ADA); see also Michael
Schachner, Suits Send Employers Running For Cover: New Statutes, Same Old Attitudes
Create Liability Woes, Bus. INs., Nov. 21, 1994, at 57 (noting the tremendous increase in
employment-related litigation at state and federal levels).
5. See Schachner, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that in the past twenty years, the federal
court docket is up 125%, while employment cases are up 2,166%); see also Evan J.
Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employment Dis-
putes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 248 (1993) (noting that more than eighteen million new
lawsuits are filed each year, a growing number of which are employment discrimination
suits).
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through discovery and finally to trial.6 This quagmire has forced individ-
uals, employers, lawmakers, and the judiciary to search for, and endorse,
other methods of resolving employment discrimination claims.7 One
method that has been examined by the judiciary over the past decade is
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).s ADR is a generic term for a
number of dispute resolution techniques, all of which are less drastic than
litigation. The term ADR generally includes negotiation,9 mediation,"
conciliation," arbitration, 2 mini-trials,' 3 and a variety of other problem
6. See Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the ADA: Do the Two
Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 REs GESTAE 168, 168 (1993) (noting time, money, and other
costs of litigation); see Skrainka, supra note 4, at 991 (observing that to litigate a "simple"
discrimination claim costs anywhere from $50,000 to $80,000). "On average, companies
find they can arbitrate between 15 and 20 cases for the cost of one wrongful discharge
lawsuit, and the process takes, on the average, one or two days and can be completed
within six months from the time of the incident." ADR Techniques Gaining Favor in Non-
Traditional Settings, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2 (Mar. 15, 1993).
7. See Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The Interaction Between the Employ-
ment-at-Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Fair Em-
ployment Practice Claims: Difficult Choices For At-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443,
455-56 (1995) (mentioning congressional endorsement of ADR in both the ADA and The
Civil Rights Act of 1991); Silberman et al., supra note 3, at 1536 (noting congressional and
judicial approval of ADR). For a discussion of judicial acquiescence to arbitration see
infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
8. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-40
(1985). Mitsubishi was the first of what has become known as the Mitsubishi trilogy, a
series of three cases which recognized a presumption of arbitratability. See Heidi M. Hel-
lekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims:
The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising
Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REV. 435, 438-42 (1994) (discussing the history
of Title VII Arbitration); see also R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law:
Individual Autonomy and the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1863, 1884-85 (1994) (discussing the Mitsubishi trilogy).
9. Robert B. Fitzpatrick & Marlissa S. Brigette, Current Developments in Employ-
ment Law, Alternative Dispute Resolution-Types of ADR Mechanisms, 30 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 259, 266 (1995). The authors state that negotiation should be
the first approach to resolve any dispute because the approach is designed to achieve a
comprehensive, immediate, and candid discussion. Id.
10. Id. (defining mediation as "negotiation with a third party where the third party
actively promotes a mutually acceptable settlement"). The third party, often referred to as
the neutral, must have no binding authority and should coax the parties towards their own
settlement. Id. at 266-67.
11. See id. at 266 (explaining that conciliation is negotiation involving a third party
that facilitates the conflict resolution but plays no active role).
12. Id. at 268-72. Some of the advantages that arbitration provides over litigation in-
clude: a faster resolution of the conflict; a less expensive solution using fewer procedural
rules; and a more predictable outcome. Id.; see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the fact that juries frighten employers because of their random decision-
making).
13. Fitzpatrick & Brigette, supra note 9, at 273 (discussing that mini-trials are like full
trials in that they entail trial strategies and persuasive arguments but differ in that the
holdings are normally confidential and lack precedential value).
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solving techniques.' 4 ADR, while presently growing in popularity, has
not always been a preferred method of solving potential litigation.'"
While the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has existed since 1925,16 fed-
eral courts historically have been wary of ADR's ability to reach proper
decisions.' 7 This is especially true where complex statutory rights, such as
those afforded by Title VII or the ADA, are involved.'" In 1985, how-
ever, the Supreme Court expressed qualified acceptance of arbitration in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 9 when it ap-
proved of arbitration in an international commercial context.20 By 1991,
when the Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the
seeming hostility towards arbitration was all but reversed.22 In addition,
regarding the judicial adoption of arbitration and the problems of litiga-
tion, Congress has recently authorized the use of ADR "where
appropriate. - 23
14. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS: A PRI-
MER ON DRAFTING, NEGOTIATING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES 183-202 (2d ed. 1992) (dis-
cussing techniques for problem solving in alternative dispute resolution).
15. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting the
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, dating back to early English common law).
16. Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14 (1994)) [hereinafter FAA]; see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
219-20 (1985) (noting that the FAA's purpose was to make arbitration agreements the legal
equivelant of other contracts); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stating that § 2 of the FAA says that if a
contract evidences that a dispute in a commercial transaction should settle by arbitration,
that means of settlement will be enforceable).
17. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
18. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974) (noting that arbitra-
tion procedures make it an inappropriate forum for the final resolution of Title VII rights
because the arbirtator's focus is upon party intent rather than legislative requirements).
19. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
20. Id. at 638-40.
21. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
22. The Court, responding to Gilmer's arguments that arbitration did not ensure the
procedural safeguards of his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) rights,
stated,
Such generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants," and as such, they are "far out of step with our current strong en-
dorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."
Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989)); infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (describing in detail the factual basis
underlying Gilmer, and the Court's reasoning); see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638-40 (exempli-
fying the beginning of the Court's trust in arbitration as a method of dispute settlement);
see also Hayford & Evers, supra note 7, at 443 (discussing the Court's shift in attitude on
the issue of arbitration).
23. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, title V,
§ 513, 104 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, title I, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and
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In passing the Americans With Disabilities Act, Congress included sec-
tion 513 which authorized the use of alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion.24 The question that remains unresolved, however, is whether it is
"appropriate," under the ADA, for ADR agreements to be a disabled
individual's sole remedy for alleged acts of discrimination.25
In order to answer this question, this Comment will first examine the
enactment and workings of the ADA, and then briefly discuss the history
of ADR in relation to Fair Employment Practice claims. Next, this Com-
ment will discuss two lines of cases that address the arbitration of statu-
tory rights, the Gardner-Denver line and the Gilmer line. The Comment
will then discuss the important distinctions between these two lines of
cases and will illustrate how and when each applies. The Comment will
next discuss the interaction between the ADA and agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims. Next, the Comment will examine recent case law,
in both the union and non-union context, that helps determine whether a
disabled individual must arbitrate an ADA claim. The Comment will
conclude by analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrating
ADA claims, discussing the options of waiver and voluntary non-binding
arbitration, and will suggest a future course for employers and
employees.
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE BASICS
A. The ADA
President George Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act into
law on July 26, 1990 after the Act garnered an overwhelming majority in
Congress. 26 The Act, which some have called the "Emancipation Procla-
mation ''27 for individuals with disabilities, is expected to affect, and im-
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111,
12112, and 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994)).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994). This section, entitled "Alternative means of dispute
resolution" states, "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, fa-
cilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve dis-
putes arising under this chapter." Id.
25. See infra notes 150-95 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriateness of
union and non-union agreements to arbitrate ADA claims).
26. OGLETREE ET AL., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND
EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS §1.01 (Jonathan R. Mook ed., release no. 5, 1996) [hereinafter
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS]. The Act passed the Senate by a vote of 91-6 and the House
by a vote of 377-28. 101 CONG. REC. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990); 101 CONG. REC.
H4629-30 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).




prove the lives of, approximately forty-three million disabled persons in
the United States.28 The ADA is sweeping legislation that greatly ex-
pands upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 which was limited to federal
employees and programs.3" The ADA protects not only presently dis-
abled individuals, but also individuals who have been disabled in the past,
and even those who have never been disabled, but are regarded as being
such.31 The reason Congress enacted such broad legislation was to rem-
edy the historical isolation and segregation of individuals with disabili-
ties. 32 In fact, one of the Act's stated purposes is to provide a mandate
for the elimination of countless years of discrimination against the
disabled.33
It is important to gain an understanding of some of the ADA's basic
aspects before discussing the Act in conjunction with ADR.34 Under Ti-
tle I of the ADA, discrimination against a qualified individual with a disa-
bility is prohibited. This means that discrimination is prohibited against
individuals who either presently have,36 have a record of,3 7 or are re-
garded as having, 38 a mental or physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities,39 but who can, with or without
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). Congress found that 43 million individuals have
one or more physical or mental disabilities, and that this number is growing. Id.; see also
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, supra note 26, at 1-2.
29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994)).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994) (covering only federal departments and agencies, fed-
eral contractors, and programs conducted by private entities receiving federal financial
assistance).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
32. Id. § 12101(a)(2).
33. See id. § 12101(b)(1).
34. What follows is a very cursory glance at the main provision (Title I) of the ADA.
In order to gain a full grasp of this comprehensive statute see generally RIGHTS AND OBLI-
GATIONS, supra note 26; GARY PHELAN & JANET B. ARTERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINA-
TION IN THE WORKPLACE (1995); and JOHN J. COLEMAN, III, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT (1995).
35. The Act states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (1994). This article focuses on Title I of the ADA.
36. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
37. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
38. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
39. What constitutes a major life activity under the ADA was adopted from section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 3.0213][a].
The list, although not exhaustive, includes walking, speaking, caring for oneself, seeing,
standing, lifting, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995). To be substantially limited in
the ability to work, the EEOC has determined that an individual must be unable to per-
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reasonable accommodations, perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position in question.4° Under the Act, an employer41 is re-
quired to make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with
a disability.42 An accommodation is reasonable under the ADA if it does
not impose an undue hardship on the employer.43 In order to determine
whether an action presents an undue hardship, the Act asks whether per-
forming the action would entail "significant difficulty or expense" on the
part of the employer.44
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution
At English common law, the judicial system exhibited a strong distrust
for arbitration agreements. 45 This hostility crossed the ocean from Eng-
land and became deeply rooted in the early American judicial system. 6
In an effort to put arbitration agreements on more solid ground, Con-
gress, in 1925, passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).47 Since its pas-
sage, application of the FAA has remained unclear.48 Section 2 of the
FAA, which clearly endorses the binding nature of arbitration agree-
ments, states that an agreement to arbitrate shall be "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable" unless law and equity dictate otherwise 9.4  The language
contained in section 1 of the FAA, on the other hand, has resulted in
form a broad class of jobs, not just one particular job. See Ditcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that an impairment that affects only a narrow
range of jobs can be regarded as not substantially limiting a major life activity).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
41. Id. § 12111(5) (exempting from the definition of employer: the federal govern-
ment; Indian tribes; private clubs; and businesses with less than 15 employees for the ma-
jority of a calendar year).
42. A "reasonable accommodation" may include making facilities accessible or re-
structuring jobs, schedules, equipment, etc. in order to fit the needs of a qualified individ-
ual. Id. § 12111(9). In fact, much of the litigation under the ADA deals with reasonable
accommodations.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
44. Id. The statute lays out the factors that are to be considered in assessing whether
an action requires "significant difficulty or expense." The factors are the nature and cost of
the accommodation, the financial resources of the facility called upon to make the accom-
modation, the overall size of the "covered entity," and the type of operation that the entity
is engaged in. Id.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924) (noting the "jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction").
46. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
47. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)) [hereinafter Federal Arbitration Act or FAA].
48. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25. The Supreme Court expressly decided not to deal with
the exclusionary clause of § 1 of the FAA. Id. at 25 n.2; see also Wendy S. Tien, Note,
Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1443,
1444 (1993) (noting that the breadth of the FAA has yet to be determined).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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much debate. A clause in that section implies that the FAA does not
apply to employment contracts for workers engaged in interstate com-
merce.5" This "exclusionary clause" has caused debate because it is un-
clear what a "contract of employment" is, and who workers "engaged in
commerce" are under the FAA; as yet, the Supreme Court has not de-
fined these terms and therefore the scope of the FAA is still somewhat
unclear.51
The FAA has gone a long way towards judicial acceptance of arbitra-
tion agreements.52 As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in
Gilmer, "It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."'53 The Court
went on to cite a number of cases that have held arbitration agreements
enforceable when statutory claims were at issue.54 The Gilmer Court rec-
ognized that by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, an individual is
not giving up his statutory right; he is simply submitting the claim to a
different forum for enforcement.55 But, the Court concluded that not all
statutory claims are appropriate for ADR.56 In the wake of this state-
50. Id. § 1 (stating that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce").
51. See Bales, supra note 8, at 1901-06. In the Bales article, various ideas are pro-
posed as to the meaning of these two phrases. Id. One debate examines whether "en-
gaged in commerce" was meant to focus on transportation workers, or all workers who
affect interstate commerce. Id.; see Michael G. Holcomb, Note, The Demise of the FAA's
"Contract of Employment" Exception? Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1992 J.
Disp. RESOL. 213, 219-20 (asserting that courts narrowly construe the exclusion to apply
only to employees involved in interstate commerce despite congressional intent indicating
that § I was not intended for employee/employer disputes); Jenifer A. Magyar, Comment,
Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 652-53 (1992) (stating that the choice of "interstate commerce"
indicates Congress's intent that the exception be construed broadly since courts have read
this phrase expansively). See infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
failure to address the meaning of the exclusionary clause in Gilmer). But see James A.
King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAw. 97, 114 (1993) (inter-
preting § 1 to exclude only employees of the transportation industry or those engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce); Gerard Morales & Kelly Humphrey, The Enforceability
of Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Disputes, 43 LAB. L.J. 663, 669 (1992) (arguing
that restricting § 1 to employers in the transportation industry is in accord with congres-
sional intent).
52. Arbitration and grievance procedures that began under the labor laws shortly after
World War I have also had a significant impact on judicial and legislative acceptance of
ADR. See Silberman, supra note 3, at 1534.
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
54. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (de-
ciding an arbitration agreement claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
55. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing this issue further in the
context of Gilmer).
56. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
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ment, the question, as far as the ADA is concerned, is whether alleged
discrimination on the basis of a disability is appropriate for arbitral
resolution.57
I. ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS: Two DIFFERENT
APPROACHES?
A. Gardner-Denver and its Progeny: ADR and Collective
Bargaining Agreements
The seminal case in statutory civil rights law on the issue of enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBA) is
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.58 In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme
Court faced the task of discerning the proper relationship between arbi-
tration and an individual's statutory rights under Title VII.59 Harrell Al-
exander, an African-American employee and member of the United
Steelworkers Union, was discharged for poor job performance. 60 Alex-
ander filed a grievance pursuant to the union's CBA claiming that he was
wrongfully discharged. 61 The company denied the grievance and it pro-
ceeded through the CBA mechanism to arbitration.62 The arbitrator
ruled that Alexander had been dismissed for just cause. 63 Alexander dis-
agreed with the decision and filed suit in federal district court alleging
unlawful discrimination on the basis of race. 64 His claim proceeded to
the Supreme Court which reversed both the district court and court of
appeals holdings that an arbitrator's resolution of a claim under a CBA is
dispositive of a Title VII statutory claim.65
The Supreme Court stated various reasons for reaching this decision.66
The Court first noted that Title VII protects individual rights, unlike the
majoritarian rights which are protected by collective bargaining agree-
57. See id. (placing the burden on Gilmer to show that arbitration was not intended by
Congress to be a forum for resolving discrimination claims).
58. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
59. Id. at 38.
60. Id. (alleging that as a drill operator, Alexander was making too many defective
parts).
61. Id. at 39. Alexander did not claim that he was racially discriminated against until
the final step of the grievance process. Id. at 42. It was at that point that he filed a charge
with the EEOC through the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Id.
62. Id. at 40-42.
63. Id. at 42.
64. Id. at 43.




ments.67 The Court explained that the rights Title VII confers cannot be
part of the collective bargaining process, because waiver of those rights
would "defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII."
68
The Court also expressed concern that individuals who are called upon to
arbitrate conflicts under a CBA are confined to determining the intent of
the parties and applying "the industrial common law of the shop" and
that they cannot invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain the par-
ties struck.69
The Court also rejected the lower courts' reasoning that it would be
unfair to the employer to allow the employee to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion and then, if not satisfied with the outcome, to file suit in court. 7° The
Court reasoned that by bringing a Title VII action, the employee is not
seeking another review of the CBA, but rather, he is "asserting a statu-
tory right, independent of the arbitration process."'71 In addition, the
Court noted that the Civil Rights Act of 196472 vests federal courts with
the plenary power to enforce Title VII.73 In sum, the Court held that an
individual may pursue his grievance through arbitration without being
precluded from bringing a subsequent federal court action.
74
1. Does Gardner-Denver Apply to the Fair Labor Standards Act?
In what has become known as Gardner-Denver's progeny, the Supreme
Court heard two cases that raised factually similar issues, but were
brought under different statutes. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc. ," the petitioners submitted a grievance citing a violation of
67. Id. at 51; see infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting the Court's fear that in
the collective bargaining context the interests of the individual employee may get
subordinated to the collective interest).
68. Id. The Court did note that unions have the right to waive statutory rights that are
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike. Id.
69. Id. at 53. The Court borrowed from the Steelworkers trilogy stating, "[Ain arbitra-
tor is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he
does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." Id. at 59-60 (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
70. Id. at 54. The district court and the court of appeals both reasoned that it would
be unfair to allow an employee to have his claim considered in both forums. Id. The
district court summarized this by saying that it could not "accept a philosophy which gives
the employee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one." Id. (quoting Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver, 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971)).
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
73. Id. at § 2000e-6(b).
74. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
75. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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the Fair Labor Standards Act.76 After losing an arbitration decision, peti-
tioners filed suit in federal court. 77 The district and appellate courts held
that by submitting the claim to arbitration, the plaintiffs had waived their
right to sue. 78 The Supreme Court, following Gardner-Denver, ruled
otherwise, finding that petitioners' claim was not barred by its prior sub-
mission to, and subsequent resolution through, the grievance arbitration
procedure of the CBA.79 In so holding, the Court reiterated the major
concern expressed in Gardner-Denver, that a CBA is not necessarily pro-
tective of individual rights and, therefore, being party to a CBA does not
restrict individual statutory protections.80
2. Section 1983 Actions
Three years after Gardner-Denver, in McDonald v. City of West
Branch,81 the Court reached the same conclusion, this time in the con-
text of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.82 The petitioner, a discharged
police officer, filed a grievance pursuant to his CBA claiming that there
was no cause for his dismissal.83 The arbitrator ruled against the peti-
tioner who then filed suit in federal court.84 The Supreme Court, after
examining the arbitration proceeding, stated that in a § 1983 proceeding,
arbitration cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial enforce-
ment of individual rights.85 Therefore, the Court ruled that an employee
does not waive his right to judicial enforcement of § 1983 by first submit-
ting the claim to arbitration.86
76. Id. at 729-30. The petitioners were truck drivers and members of Teamsters Local
878. Id. at 730. The union pursued their grievance through the joint grievance committee
pursuant to the CBA. Id. at 731. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 6, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1994) (establishing the compensation level and terms of the national minimum
wage).
77. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 731.
78. Id. at 734.
79. Id. at 736-37. The respondent claimed that because the CBA required that "any
controversy" between the parties be subject to binding arbitration, the petitioners should
be barred from bringing a statutory claim in federal court. Id.
80. Id. at 740-41; see infra note 86 (discussing the Court's reasoning in support of its
decisions).
81. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
82. Id. at 285.
83. Id. at 285-86.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Id. at 290-91.
86. Id. at 292. The Court gave various reasons for its decision: (1) an arbitrator's expe-
rience "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land," (2) the arbitrator
may be exceeding his scope if he decides a § 1983 action, (3) where the union has exclusive
control over the presentation of the grievance, they may present it less vigorously than the
employee himself would, and finally, (4) the degree of diligence in arbitral fact-finding is
inferior to that of judicial fact-finding. Id. at 290-91 (citations omitted).
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With its decisions in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald, the
Court made a strong statement: An employee does not waive his or her
statutory right to sue by agreeing to submit, or submitting a dispute to
binding arbitration. This statement was interpreted broadly by lower
courts until the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp. 7
B. Gilmer: The Court Examines Employee Waiver in A
Non-Union Context
In the years following Gardner-Denver and its progeny, courts recog-
nized that parties were becoming more interested in arbitrating dis-
crimination claims.88 This recognition led a number of courts to find en-
forceable individual agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.8 9 Other
courts continued to adhere to the Gardner-Denver principle that discrim-
ination claims were not subject to compulsory arbitration, regardless of
whether a CBA was involved. 9° To resolve this issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Gilmer.
The issue in Gilmer was whether an Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA)9 1 claim by a non-union employee, pursuant to an ar-
bitration agreement that the employee signed, can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration.92 The Respondent, Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp. (Interstate), hired Petitioner Gilmer as Manager of Financial Serv-
ices. 93 As conditions of employment, he registered as a securities repre-
sentative with several stock exchanges and signed an application for the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that contained an agreement to arbi-
trate any dispute between himself and Interstate. 94 Interstate discharged
87. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
88. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (describing the pitfalls that accompany
litigation); see also infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (showing some of the positive
benefits of ADR).
89. See Silberman, supra note 3, at 1542 (citing Garfield v. Thomas McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. I11. 1988), to support this proposition).
90. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all adhered to this view.
See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1045 (1990); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Manage-
ment Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989);
Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. University
of Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1986)); Silberman, supra note 3, at 1542 n.65 (citing
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
91. Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
92. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
93. Id.
94. Id. The NYSE, one of the groups with which he was registered, had a rule that
provided for arbitration of "any controversy ... arising out of employment." Id.
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Petitioner at the age of sixty-two. 95 Gilmer, in turn, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
alleging that Interstate had violated the ADEA.96 Respondent filed a
motion to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration agreement and
the FAA.97 The district court denied the motion relying on Gardner-
Denver, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that "nothing in the text,
legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicat[es] a con-
gressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements." 98
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals99 and, in so doing,
muddled the entire issue of arbitrability of statutory claims.
At first glimpse the Gilmer decision appears to directly oppose the
Court's holding in Gardner-Denver, but upon further analysis, this is not
true. In fact, the Court went to great lengths to distinguish the two
cases.1 °° The first distinguishing feature is that the Gilmer Court decided
the case under the FAA, which strongly favors arbitration.10 1 The Court
applied the FAA because the section 1 exclusionary clause regarding
"contracts of employment" did not apply to Gilmer's agreement with the
NYSE, as Gilmer was not an employee of the NYSE. 102 A second dis-
tinction the Court made was that the Gardner-Denver line of cases in-
volved union employees covered by CBAs, while Gilmer involved an
individual employee. Therefore, unlike the petitioner in Gardner-Den-
ver, Gilmer raised no concern that "the interests of the individual em-
ployee [would] be subordinated, to the collective interests."'0 3 This
distinction made the Court more comfortable in binding the petitioner to
his agreement to arbitrate because in this case, unlike the union situation,
the individual has a full opportunity to assert and argue his claim at the
arbitration stage. One court, in summarizing this distinction, stated that
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 297 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
500 U.S. 20 (1991); see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
100. See Bales, supra note 8, at 1886-94 (discussing the ways in which the Court distin-
guished Gilmer from Gardner-Denver).
101. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (describing the FAA's approval of
arbitration).
102. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25. In a footnote, the Court stated that "[Section] l's exclu-
sionary clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement," and therefore the Court
chose to "leave for another day" the issue of the FAA exclusionary clause. Id. at 25 n.2;
see William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really
Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 264 (1994) (noting that the
Court addressed but did not answer the FAA exclusionary issue).
103. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
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"Gilmer does not alter the protection established in Gardner-Denver
against waiver of individual statutory rights through collective bargaining
agreements."1
0 4
With these distinctions in mind, the Court stated that "[h]aving made
the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue."'1 5 The Court then mentioned that if
such a congressional intention exists, it would likely be found in the text,
legislative history, or in an inherent conflict between the Act in question
and arbitration.' °6 Having found no such intention in the ADEA, the
Court compelled Gilmer to adhere to the arbitration agreement.
10 7
C. What Gilmer Left Unanswered
In the wake of Gilmer, many issues have been left undetermined, and
future decisions will need to address these concerns. The first issue that
Gilmer left unanswered is whether its rationale applies to other civil
rights statutes or simply to the ADEA.10 8 It is safe to say that if the
Court had intended to limit its holding strictly to the ADEA, it would
have made that explicit. Instead, the Court constructed a test to deter-
mine whether Gilmer's command to arbitrate applies to other statutes. 10 9
The Gilmer test requires a reviewing court to closely examine the text,
legislative history, and purpose of a particular statute in deciding whether
an agreement to arbitrate is appropriate." 0 Some lower courts have ap-
plied this test in Title VII actions and have concluded that Gilmer's com-
mand of arbitrability applies to Title VII claims."' Other courts have
104. See Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141,146-47 (D. Conn. 1993).
In Claps, the plaintiff brought a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII. Id. at 143-44.
The defendant asserted that Claps was barred from bringing her claim in federal court
because her union's CBA mandated that all disputes be submitted to grievance arbitration.
Id. at 144. The court relied on Gardner-Denver and stated that the CBA did not require
the employee to arbitrate her claim. Id. at 143-47.
105. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
106. Id. ("'Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."') (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 35.
108. See Silberman, supra note 3, at 1546 (discussing the various issues that were left
unresolved in Gilmer).
109. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
110. Id. The Court noted that "all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitra-
tion." Id.
111. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a Title VII claim was arbitrable); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding no evidence that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of Title
VII claims). Various commentators have argued that Gilmer should not be applied to
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maintained the pre-Gilmer thinking and held that Gardner-Denver ap-
plies to all Title VII claims, even those outside of the collective bargain-
ing context.' 12  One court reasoned that because eliminating
discrimination is of such a high priority, employees cannot prospectively
waive, at any time, their right to a judicial forum for Title VII claims. 113
This will become important in the next section of this paper, which deter-
mines whether compulsory arbitration is appropriate under the ADA.
A second issue Gilmer left unresolved is the scope of judicial review of
the arbitration decision. Gilmer involved only the narrow issue of
whether an agreement to arbitrate could be enforced. While the Court
did not explicitly speak to the issue of appealability of the arbitrator's
decision,"1 it did use language indicating its view that the arbitration de-
cision should be final. For instance, the Court stated that by agreeing to
go to arbitration, a party submits his rights to resolution in that forum,
rather than through the judicial system.' 5
To clarify the issues that Gilmer left unresolved, the Court may need to
hear another case involving arbitration of statutory employment discrimi-
nation claims. If it does, some unresolved issues may be answered, but
until then, each claim will have to be analyzed on the basis of the statute
upon which it is brought. This Comment will now examine what might
occur if arbitration cases are brought under the auspices of the ADA.
other statutes. See Mark D. Klimek, Note, Discrimination Claims Under Title VII: Where
Mandatory Arbitration Goes Too Far, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 425 (1993) (arguing
that arbitration is an inappropriate forum for settling individual Title VII claims); Tien,
supra note 48, at 1460-76 (making a similar argument, for ADA claims).
112. See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding Title VII and Minn. Human Rights Act violations not subject to arbitration), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989).
113. Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1045 (1990).
114. See Silberman, supra note 3, at 1549 (noting that the court did not have to and
consequently, did not discuss this issue).
115. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29. Other language in the opinion also indicates that the
court intended for the arbitration to be final. The Court at one point stated that in a recent
amendment to the ADEA, Congress did not preclude arbitration or other non-judicial
resolution of claims. Id. at 26.
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III. THE INTERACTION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS AND ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES AcT
A. Union-Collective Bargaining Context
To date, six courts have addressed the issue of whether ADA claims
must be arbitrated. 16 Of those six, five litigants have raised the issue in
the context of an agreement to arbitrate contained in a CBA. Previous
Supreme Court case law dictates that when dealing with cases of this na-
ture, the appropriate starting point is Gardner-Denver."7 Of the five
courts addressing this issue, four relied on Gardner-Denver in reaching
their decision, while one applied Gilmer.
1. Relying on Gardner-Denver
In Block v. Art Iron, Inc.," 8 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana contemplated an alleged violation of the
ADA." 9 Plaintiff Kenneth Block was an employee of Art Iron until he
developed carpal tunnel syndrome and was terminated. 120 As a member
of the Shopmen's Local Union No. 726, Block was covered by the union's
CBA.12 ' The CBA contained an arbitration clause that mandated that all
disputes go through a grievance procedure and then to arbitration. 122
Block's union initiated, but later withdrew, its request to arbitrate Block's
claim.1 23 Consequently, he brought his claim in federal court alleging vi-
olation of his "civil and statutory rights" as provided in the ADA.
1 24
116. See infra notes 118-49 and accompanying text (describing these cases and their
outcome).
117. See Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380, 383 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (stating that
Gardner-Denver is the leading Supreme Court case on this issue and serves as an appropri-
ate starting point); Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 145 (D. Conn.
1993) (stating that when an arbitration agreement case involves a CBA, the "line of au-
thority begins" with Gardner-Denver).
118. 866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
119. Id. at 383.
120. Id. The company's stated reason for the termination was that Block had not been
able to work for twelve months. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The arbitration clause stated that "[a]ny grievance or dispute between the
Company and the Union or between the company and an employee(s) ... shall, upon the
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Defendant Art Iron moved for summary judgment relying on Gil-
mer.12 5 The court rejected defendant's motion and stated, "Block's ADA
claim is not governed by the arbitration clause of the CBA and Block is
not precluded from pursuing his claim in federal court. '12 6 After discuss-
ing both Gardner-Denver and Gilmer at length, the court affirmed the
notion that "Gilmer did not establish a grand presumption in favor of
arbitration" 12 7 and decided that in order for the CBA to support
compulsory arbitration of statutory claims, it would have to explicitly pro-
vide that employees' statutory ADA rights are subject to compulsory
arbitration.12 8
Three other courts have reached the same conclusion as Block.1 29 In
those cases the courts generally relied on the distinction drawn in Gilmer
between cases involving collective bargaining agreements and cases' in-
volving individual employment agreements.1 30 An employee seeks to
vindicate his contractual rights when he submits a grievance to arbitration
under the CBA, but when he files a Title VII action, he is asserting an
independent statutory right.13 1 One court added, "The distinctly separate
nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely be-
cause both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.' 32
2. The Western District of Virginia-Adopting Gilmer
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,133 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia reached the op-
125. Id. The company also relied on Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 844
F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994). Id.; see infra notes 133-142 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Austin in greater detail).
126. Block, 866 F. Supp. at 387.
127. Id. at 386 (quoting Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 933 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993)).
128. See id. at 387 (inferring that the only way that such an agreement will be upheld is
if it is bargained over and expressly put into the CBA).
129. See, e.g., Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co. (LIRR), 997 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1993)
(deciding a case under the Rehabilitation Act and holding that arbitration procedures pre-
scribed under the Railway Labor Act are not an individual's sole forum for resolution of
discrimination claims); Bruton v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 3 A.D. Cases 117, 1994
W.L. 470277, *3 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that union contractual agreements cannot pre-
clude a statutory claim, especially "in the cases of collective bargaining agreements, as
there is a potential disparity in the interests of a union and the interests of an individual
employee"); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that
employees' ADA claims were not barred by their failure to arbitrate them pursuant to the
CBA).
130. See Schmidt, 864 F. Supp. at 995; see also supra notes 103-04 and accompanying
text (discussing this distinction).
131. Schmidt, 864 F. Supp. at 995.
132. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, (1974)).
133. 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994).
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posite conclusion of the four cases above. The plaintiff, Linda Austin, a
unionized employee, worked as an equipment cleaner/oiler-greaser for
the defendant.' 34 During her course of employment, she was injured on
the job and became disabled.13 She alleged that the defendant skirted its
duty under the ADA to reasonably accommodate her by offering her
light duty work until she could return to her former position.' 36 The de-
fendant moved to dismiss the action claiming, in part, that Austin was
barred from bringing suit because she failed to utilize the grievance arbi-
tration procedure available under the CBA. 137 The court agreed with the
defendant and granted its motion for summary judgment. 38
Chief Judge Kiser determined that because the CBA mandated that all
disputes be settled by arbitration, the plaintiff was forced to use the griev-
ance-arbitration mechanism, not the courts, to remedy her ADA claim. 139
The Austin court never cited, or even referenced, Gardner-Denver or its
progeny. In fact, Gilmer was the only case the court cited. It appears
that the Austin court was not mindful of the distinctions that the Supreme
Court carefully delineated between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer with re-
gard to collective bargaining agreements. 140 Block v. Art Iron,'14' decided
a few months after Austin, confirmed that Austin may have been incor-
rectly decided by stating that the Seventh Circuit "would not approve of
the Austin court's ruling insofar as it holds that ADA claims may be
waived by way of general arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements., 142
B. What Happens In the Non-Union Context?
Only one decision has been rendered in a case involving an individual
employee's agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. In Solomon v. Duke
University,"4 the plaintiff, Betty Solomon, was discharged by the Uni-
versity for making personal phone calls from work.'" She alleged that a
134. Id. at 1103.
135. Id. at 1103-04.
136. Id. at 1104. The plaintiff's doctor had released her to engage in light duty work.
Id.
137.. Id. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff's suit was barred because she
did not obtain a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Id. Plaintiff claimed that the EEOC
"administratively rejected" her complaint, therefore she had exhausted the EEOC admin-
istrative avenues of redress. Id. at 1104 n.2.
138. Id. at 1107.
139. Id. at 1106-07.
140. See id. (citing only Gilmer in its resolution of this issue).
141. 886 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
142. Id. at 387.
143. 850 F. Supp. 372 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
144. Id. at 372.
1996] 1297
Catholic University Law Review
disability caused memory lapses such that she did not remember making
the calls. 145 The University denied her request for medical leave, and she
submitted a grievance through the grievance-arbitration procedure that
covered non-exempt employees of the University. 146 The arbitrator ruled
against Ms. Solomon, who then brought an ADA action in federal
court. 14 7 The district court, in a short opinion, 148 stated that because Ms.
Solomon had voluntarily submitted her grievance to binding arbitration,
she was precluded from subsequently litigating the claims that were adju-
dicated in the arbitration. 4 9
IV. NON-UNION AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE ADA CLAIMS:
APPLYING THE GiLMER TEST
Other than Solomon, there is no authority that speaks to the issue of
whether an employer can make compulsory arbitration a requirement for
all employees. Since there is no case law and this situation involves indi-
vidual employees, we must return to Gilmer to determine whether a stat-
utory claim under the ADA may be subject to compulsory arbitration.
Gilmer states that while all statutory claims are not appropriate for arbi-
tration, if a party makes the voluntary bargain to arbitrate they should be
held to that agreement unless Congress, in the text, legislative history, or
underlying purposes of the Act, has evinced an intent to preclude waiver
of the statutory rights.150 In order to discern whether such a congres-
sional intent exists in the ADA, we must begin with textual examination
of the ADA.
A. The Text
The text of the ADA is unclear as to whether arbitration is an appro-
priate means of settling disputes under the Act. 5' On the one hand, sec-
145. Id.
146. Id. The court does not make it clear, but it seems that any non-exempt employee,
as a condition of employment, can agree to arbitrate any disputes. Id.
147. Id.
148. Before the court addressed the agreement to arbitrate, it granted the defendant's
motion to confirm the arbitration decision. Id. at 373. The court did this because under
the FAA, the plaintiff had not moved to vacate or modify the decision of the arbitrator in a
timely manner. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1994) (noting that any motion to modify or
vacate must be made within three months of the arbitration decision).
149. Solomon, 850 F. Supp. at 373 (citing Rainwater v. National Home Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Central Transp., Inc. v. Four Phase Sys., Inc., 936 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1991)). In Central Transport, the court added, "The arbitrator's decision that
Plaintiff was terminated for cause prevents Plaintiff from alleging that her employment was
terminated in violation of statutory or common law." Id.
150. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994) (codifying Section 513 of the ADA).
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tion 513 of the Act clearly states that the use of alternative dispute
resolution is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Act. 152 In
this section, the Act approves the use of settlement negotiations, concilia-
tion, mediation, arbitration, and other ADR techniques.153 The text of
the Act thereby appears to allow employers to enter into binding arbitra-
tion agreements with their employees or unions. Along these lines, one
commentator has asserted that the use of the word "encourage" connotes
"permission," and that language alone should be sufficient to overcome
any argument that Congress meant to exclude arbitration as a means of
resolution.' 54
A contrary position can be espoused by looking at the stated purposes
of the Act. Congress mandated that one purpose of the Act is "to ensure
that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards established in this [Act] on behalf of individuals with disabili-
ties."' 155 This language clearly implies that Congress intended the federal
court system to be involved in enforcement of the ADA. Commentators
have opined that this language demonstrates Congress's fundamental
mistrust of compulsory binding arbitration as a means of resolving ADA
claims.156 Because the text of the Act is contradictory, Gilmer commands
that we consult the legislative history.
B. Legislative History
Congress carefully considered and thoroughly discussed the ADA
before it became law.1 57 This wealth of legislative history is remarkably
clear on the issue of whether an employer can require employees to sub-
mit to arbitration instead of bringing their ADA claim in court.1 58 Con-
gress continually underscored the fact that it did not approve of binding,
final arbitration as a remedy under ADA but rather, approved of ADR to
152. Id.; see supra note 24 (outlining the text of this section).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
154. Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The
Need For Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 552 (1994).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) (1994).
156. See Tien, supra note 48, at 1469-70 (arguing that arbitration should be supplemen-
tal to other methods of enforcement available under the Act).
157. For a sampling of the Act's legislative history, see RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS,
supra note 26, § 1.04[3]. Compare the amount of ADA legislative history with the dearth
of legislative history accompanying the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
158. See Robert E. Stein, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: A New 'Bill Of
Rights'for Millions, 46 ARB. 6, 15 (1991) (discussing alternative dispute resolution issues in
the ADA).
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"supplement, not supplant" judicial remedies.159 The Judiciary Commit-
tee carefully examined predispute arbitration agreements before drafting
its report on the Act. 160  In that report, the Committee ultimately
adopted the rationale of Gardner-Denver by stating that any agreement
to submit claims to arbitration, whether in the context of a CBA or an
individual employment contract, does not prohibit the individual from
seeking judicial relief. 61 The Conference Committee Report added that
the use of ADR is totally voluntary, and that "[u]nder no condition would
an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement or employment
contract prevent an individual from pursuing their rights under the
ADA. "162
The legislative history clearly indicates that compulsory arbitration is
not an option under the ADA in either the union or non-union context.
The legislative language demonstrates that binding arbitration was not
intended to be an individual's exclusive remedy under the ADA. One
commentator appropriately characterized the congressional intent con-
cerning the role of ADR under the ADA as an "overlapping remedy.' 1 63
The real question, however, is whether the legislative history satisfies
the Gilmer test. Under Gilmer, for an individual not to be bound by an
agreement to arbitrate, that individual must show a congressional intent
to preclude the waiver of judicial remedies. 164 While the text of the Act
is ambiguous, the ADA's legislative history evinces just such a congres-
sional intent. By mandating that any agreement to arbitrate not preclude
traditional judicial remedies, 65 Congress was, in essence, stating that an
individual cannot prospectively waive his or her rights to judicial enforce-
ment of the ADA. The rationale, in part, was that the ADA, like Title
VII, not only protects individual rights, but also serves a public function
159. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499.
160. Abrams, supra note 154, at 553.
161. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500.
162. See Report of the Conference Comm. on Americans With Disabilities Act: Joint
Explanatory Statements, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 136
CONG. REC. H4582, H4606 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (citing the remarks of Representative
Glickman). The Conference Committee adopted, by reference, the report of the House
Judiciary Committee. Abrams, supra note 154, at 554; see also Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866
F. Supp. 380, 386 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (quoting the relevant language).
163. Tien, supra note 48, at 1470.
164. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (finding that the burden
of showing this congressional intent is on the individual attempting to avoid being bound
by the arbitration agreement).
165. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500.
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that would be lost without judicial enforcement of the Act. 166 Having
concluded that compulsory arbitration may not be the exclusive remedy
available under the ADA, the focus shifts to the merits of the rule.
V. PROS AND CONS OF ADR FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
Congress recognized that the disabled are a "discrete and insular mi-
nority," who have been discriminated against for many years.167 These
individuals consistently have been denied the right to equal employment
opportunities. 168 One of the ADA's primary goals is the eradication of
this discrimination.
169
To accomplish this goal, employers must be aware that the Act will be
judicially enforced. One commentator has asserted that allowing arbitra-
tion to settle ADA claims will not deter employees from engaging in fu-
ture discrimination. 170  She argues that if arbitration becomes the
mainstay of ADA claims, few legal opinions will be elicited, resulting in
little judicial precedent. 17' Employees, she argues, will become wary of
filing an ADA suit because of the uncertainty surrounding judicial resolu-
tion.1 72 Conversely, some commentators argue that without ADR, public
support for the ADA will be undermined.173 They assert that without
ADR, the cost and expense of litigation will render the Act meaningless
for the average disabled employee.' 74
A. The Benefits of ADR
If employers had their preference, many, if not most, would submit all
of their discrimination claims to ADR because it is less costly and usually
166. See infra text accompanying notes 175-80 (discussing the positive aspects of ADR).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). The Act states:
[Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful une-
qual treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our soci-
ety, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual abil-
ity of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Id.
168. Tien, supra note 48, at 1470-71.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
170. Tien, supra note 48, at 1471.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 8.05[21 n.12 (arguing that without
ADR, potential beneficiaries of the ADA may not be able to take advantage of the Act
due to the burdensome nature of the judicial process).
174. This argument is flawed in that while it could be made about any civil rights stat-
ute, it has not proven true. See Schachner, supra note 4 (noting the huge backlog of ADA
complaints presently at the EEOC).
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arbitrators, unlike juries, do not render large punitive damages awards.175
In addition, employers prefer arbitrators to juries because they tend to be
more rational decision-makers.176 Another benefit that ADR offers em-
ployers is the opportunity to sit down with the claimant and try to work
things out. If a settlement can be devised, not only have both sides saved
time and expense, but the employer may not have to hire and train a new
employee. 77 Mediation, arbitration and other forms of ADR tend to be
less adversarial than a traditional lawsuit, and often both parties emerge
from the process feeling victorious. 78 One final and often overlooked
benefit of ADR is its speed, which tolls the running of the backpay clock
for an employer, instead of running it for several years if a case went to
trial. 1 79
From an employee's perspective, arbitration can provide a quicker res-
olution, resulting in a more timely award of damages. ADR also offers
workers a more expedient return to the workforce because if the claim is
settled amicably, they can return to their jobs with less tension. ADR is
equally beneficial for employers and the economy of the nation.180 These
benefits suggest that if arbitration is accepted as the sole remedy, both
employers and employees may readily accept arbitration and effectively
remove ADA claims from judicial scrutiny. Nonetheless, there are disad-
vantages to utilizing ADR from both an employer's and an employee's
perspective.
B. The Negative Side of ADR: What Each Side May Not Realize
ADR, although seemingly a bed of roses, also contains some thorns.
While it is true that since Mitsubishi, courts have endorsed ADR as a
175. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 6, at 171 (noting that arbitration is beneficial to
employers because they avoid the uncertainty of a jury trial which may involve juries bi-
ased in favor of the plaintiff); see also Silberman et al., supra note 3, at 1539.
176. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 6, at 171. The authors explain that this is especially
true when the litigation focuses on complex laws such as the ADA. Id.; see also Skrainka,
supra note 4, at 992-93 (arguing that arbitration promises several advantages, such as bet-
ter decisions, simpler procedures, lower costs, and greater predictability).
177. See Peter D. Blanck, On Integrating Persons With Mental Retardation: The ADA
and ADR, 22 N.M. L. REV. 259, 275 (1992) (noting that ADR allows the employer and
employee to meet face-to-face and work out flexible solutions to their problems).
178. While a few commentators have referred to these ideas in passing, no one has
focused on these ideas in the context of the ADA. For support of this argument, see Ellen
Yamshon, Disabilities Act Doesn't Have To Be Bad News For Business, THE SACRAMENTO
BEE, Nov. 13, 1994, at F2.
179. See Schachner, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that the judicial system and the EEOC
are so jammed, that by waiting to go to court, one is simply running the clock).
180. See RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 1.02[3] n.30 and accompanying




valid method of settling disputes, many disadvantages for employers and
employees exist. From the employer's point of view, the major negative
in arbitration is the large number of individuals who are likely to come
forward with claims of discrimination.18' In today's society, employees
are aware of their statutory rights, and are more willing to challenge deci-
sions their employers make. 182 As one commentator notes, this combina-
tion means that employees may seek an inexpensive way to litigate their
disputes, which arbitration can provide. 18 3 He asserts that employees will
abuse the relatively inexpensive arbitration process, causing many more
claims to be brought against employers. 184 Another potential dilemma is
that many employers prefer other methods of ADR over arbitration be-
cause they do not like outsiders deciding their fate.185 From an em-
ployer's standpoint, another disadvantage to arbitration is that protracted
litigation often forces the employee into a settlement that is favorable to
the employer. 186 On the other hand, ADR methods do not tend to in-
duce employees to settle their claims.187
From an employee's point of view, arbitration has its disadvantages as
well. First, many persons have argued that arbitration panels are biased
in favor of employers."88 They assert that the lack of diversity with re-
spect to gender, race, and social status among arbitrators can work
against employees. 189  In Olson v. American Arbitration Association,
181. For a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration from
an employer's perspective, see Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There A Better
Way? Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims after Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 197, 210-12 (1993); see also, Hayford & Evers, supra note 7, at 495-527 (arguing that by
submitting claims to arbitration, employers are giving up the major shield of the employee-
at-will doctrine).
182. Silberman et al., supra note 3, at 1536-37 (explaining why employees are increas-
ingly adopting internal ADR methods).
183. Id. at 1537 (arguing that employees may prefer arbitration to the EEOC and other
state employment agencies).
184. Arbitration is not wholly inexpensive, the arbitrator must be paid, there is discov-
ery involved, albeit to a much more limited extent than in actual litigation, and attorneys
are often called upon to argue the matters. See id. at 1539-40 (describing these and other
issues concerning arbitration).
185. See id. This is especially true because many other ADR techniques are non-bind-
ing. Id.
186. See Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 6, at 172 (noting that individuals often "wear
down" during trial preparation).
187. See id. (explaining why arbitration is not always preferable for the employer).
188. See Howard, supra note 102, at 273-77.
189. Id. at 276; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES (1994); cf. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 6, at 172 (noting that
many employers view arbitrators as pro-employee).
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Inc.,"' the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas was confronted with this argument. 191 The court rejected the asser-
tion that arbitration panels are composed primarily of white males who
do not represent a cross-section of society,192 stating that these allega-
tions constituted mere speculation. 193
More importantly, the other negative aspect of compulsory arbitration
is that it voids the employee's right to have his or her claim heard in
court. The right to have one's claim litigated is a staple of the Civil
Rights Acts. 194 Employees are particularly affected if, as some commen-
tators have claimed, judges and juries prove "time and time again" to be
friendly to the ADA plaintiff.195
VI. Is IT EVER POSSIBLE To USE ADR IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE ADA?
Having determined that the legislative history of the ADA does not
permit binding compulsory arbitration as the sole remedy in either the
collective bargaining or individual employee context,1 96 what options ex-
ist for employers and employees who truly want to use ADR? One op-
tion commentators have proposed is the waiving of the right to judicial
resolution of the statutory claims.197 In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme
Court implied that an individual could voluntarily waive his cause of ac-
tion under Title VII, if this waiver was knowing and voluntary. 198 Other
courts, adhering to the principle that the right of access to the courts is
fundamental, have determined that the individual must have been aware
of all material information about the arbitration procedure to constitute a
knowing waiver.' 99 In addition, he must have known that by waiving, he
190. 876 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 1995).
191. Id. at 850; see Nina Schuyler, Expensive Cost Cutting, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1995, at 37
(reiterating the argument made in Olsen).
192. Olsen, 876 F. Supp. at 852.
193. Id.
194. See Tien, supra note 48, at 1468-70 (discussing the underlying purpose of the ADA
and other similar civil rights statutes such as Title VII).
195. See Schachner, supra note 4. One management lawyer recommends that employ-
ers explore ADR to avoid going into the judicial system. Id.
196. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer and how it comports with the legislative history of the ADA).
197. Tien, supra note 48, at 1472-73 (arguing that Congress did not intend to completely
preclude arbitration of ADA disputes).
198. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,52 n.15 (1974); see also Tien, supra
note 48, at 1472-73 (citing Gardner-Denver).
199. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that prisoners have a fun-
damental constitutional right to be assisted in legal preparation).
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was giving up his right to judicial trial.2 00 In order to be voluntary, the
court must look at "the circumstances surrounding the execution of each
arbitration agreement in order to gauge the coercive potential of the
setting. 20 1
Subsequent decisions have stated that the waiver must be clear and
unequivocal to be enforceable because the rights being waived go beyond
the employee's benefit-they are expressions of public policy.202 In addi-
tion to being voluntary, courts have stated clearly that civil rights claims
cannot be prospectively waived. 0 3 This does not, however, foreclose the
opportunity for employers and employees to agree to waive judicial reso-
lution of a claim after that claim has arisen.2 4 If both parties voluntarily
agree to this type of waiver,20 5 a court likely would bind the employee to
his agreement. After-the-fact voluntary waiver is one option for parties
who wish to partake in the benefits of ADR.
Another option for employers and employees is non-binding arbitra-
tion. This type of ADR would allow for the possibility of settling the
dispute without denying the employee the right to file an ADA claim in
court.20 6 Non-binding arbitration is similar to a settlement agreement in
that if the individual feels the result of the claim is unsatisfactory, he
200. Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
201. Id. at 789.
202. See Howard, supra note 102, at 287 & 287 nn.312-13 (citing Matthew W. Finkin,
Commentary on "Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Union," 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 799, 808-09 (1990) and Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994)).
203. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (noting that in the con-
text of collective bargaining, an employee's rights cannot be waived prospectively under
Title VII). Many portions of the ADA were modeled after Title VII, including the reme-
dies; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the prospective waiver mandate applies to
the ADA as well. See Block v. Art Iron Corp., 866 F. Supp. 380, 386-88 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(discussing the ADA's legislative history and how other courts have interpreted it).
204. Tien, supra note 48, at 1473. The author states that once an ADA claim arises,
"parties who wish to arbitrate should first attempt to agree on final and binding arbitration
expressly conditioned on waiver of judicial resolution." Id. It is important to note that this
type of after-the-fact agreement could not be used where a collective bargaining agreement
governed the workplace. The reason for this is that the NLRA commands the employer to
deal with the union, not individuals, and by entering into this type of agreement with an
individual employee, the employer would be subjecting himself to unfair labor practice
charges under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), and 9(a) of the NLRA. See Mary K. O'Melvany,
The Americans With Disabilities Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Ac-
commodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky. L.J. 219, 246 (1994) (noting that if the
employer and the union agreed through collective bargaining that the employer would set
up an ADA claim resolution process, then it would be authorized by law).
205. It is likely that a court would still examine whether the waiver was voluntary by
looking at the particular facts. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (describing
the standard for voluntary waiver).
206. Tien, supra note 48, at 1473.
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reserves the right to go to court.2 °7 The problem with this type of volun-
tary arbitration, which has not been discussed extensively, 208 is that com-
mon sense dictates that few employers will be willing to go through the
time and expense of voluntary arbitration knowing that if they win, the
employee may still file suit. The employer will still be liable for front and
backpay as well as other remedies. Therefore, there is little incentive to
participate in non-binding arbitration from an employer's perspective.
In order to give employers the necessary incentive to engage in volun-
tary arbitration, one option is the concept of quasi-binding arbitration.
This middle road type of arbitration ensures that both sides gain some
benefit from engaging in the process. In quasi-binding arbitration, an em-
ployer and employee would agree to voluntarily arbitrate a claim and the
employer would gain something regardless of the outcome. One possibil-
ity is the tolling of the front and backpay clocks.2"9 If, as part of volun-
tary arbitration, the backpay clock was tolled from the date of the
arbitration until final resolution of the issue, then the employer is offered
some incentive to voluntarily arbitrate. This does not injure the em-
ployee to any great extent because if he wins his case, he will still get
compensatory and possibly punitive damages.
Another option presently being experimented with is federal court-an-
nexed arbitration. This idea allows federal courts to institute local rules
requiring that any discrimination cases involving claims under $100,000
be submitted to non-binding arbitration. One commentator predicts
that this program will continue to expand as judges feel the need to
lighten their dockets.21 '
Voluntary arbitration sounds like a viable way to alleviate the cost and
time of litigation, but in order for it to succeed, ideas like this one will
have to be examined in greater depth. If successful, these types of ideas
207. Id.
208. But cf. id. at 1475. Tien argues that not all individuals who are dissatisfied with the
arbitrator's decision will proceed to court. Id. She recognizes that some litigants will real-
ize that the arbitrator was correct and will drop the charges, thereby saving the expense of
filing a suit. Id. Tien states that this will help alleviate the present backup at the EEOC
and in the judicial system. Id.
209. Front and backpay are remedies for a violation of the ADA. JAMES G. FRIERSON,
EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 405 (2d ed. 1995). Back
pay is a more common remedy than front pay and is not granted for more than two years
prior to the filing of the charge. Id. Generally, interim earnings or amounts that could be
earned with reasonable diligence are deducted. Id. Front pay is lost future earnings, and is
awarded only if it is unreasonable to order reinstatement or hiring because of animosity
between the parties. Id.
210. Skrainka, supra note 4, at 987; see Spelfogel, supra note 5, at 249 (noting that this
pilot program exists in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York).
211. Skrainka, supra note 4, at 987.
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would help employers and employees make use of the many positive as-
pects of ADR, and could begin alleviating the backlog at the EEOC and
possibly lessen the burden on the judicial system.
VII. CONCLUSION
ADR is a method that can achieve the same result as a judicial trial
without the unnecessary time and expense. As court dockets gets more
crowded and employees continue to file discrimination suits, ADR in-
creasingly becomes a viable alternative to the court system. Congress
recognized the benefits of ADR and included a clause in the ADA en-
couraging the use of ADR, but the legislative history of the Act indicates
that employers cannot require compulsory binding arbitration. This
leaves voluntary non-binding ADR and after-the-fact waiver as the only
methods of alternative dispute resolution available under the ADA.
Ideas have been proposed and experimented with, that, if accepted, could
thrust ADR into the limelight of employment discrimination law, and al-
low it to take its place as a much needed aid to the judicial system.
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